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SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTIONS,
CORRUPTION, AND THE PROXY
WAR OVER COORDINATION
RICHARD L. HASEN
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, journalist and supply-side economics enthusiast Jude
Wanniski wrote an op-ed in the New York Times noting an anomaly:
1
Under the Supreme Court’s campaign finance rulings, billionaire
Steve Forbes could spend $25 million (or any amount) to support his
own candidacy to be president, but he could donate only $1000 to
2
Jack Kemp’s presidential campaign. Forbes believed that Kemp
would have been a more effective candidate to promote Forbes’s
views, and Wanniski suggested that Forbes should have been able to
3
give $25 million directly to Kemp to bankroll a Kemp candidacy.
Wanniski saw nothing wrong with Forbes giving Kemp so much
money: “Wouldn’t we expect President Kemp, with his $25 million
Copyright © 2014 Richard L. Hasen.
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. Thanks to Bob
Bauer, Guy Charles, Jim Gardner, Larry Lessig, Justin Levitt, Rick Pildes, Brad Smith, and
participants at the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and Public Policy symposium for useful
comments and suggestions.
1. The modern era begins with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). On Buckley’s key
holdings, see RICHARD L. HASEN, LEGISLATION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, AND
ELECTION LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS ch. 13 (forthcoming 2014); DANIEL HAYS
LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN & DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW—CASES AND
MATERIALS ch. 14 (5th ed. 2012).
2. Jude Wanniski, Bowing for Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1995, at A31. For my
response, see Richard L. Hasen, Letter to the Editor, Let’s Not Auction Off Political Access,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/04/opinion/l-let-snot-auction-off-political-access-037320.html.
3. Wanniski, supra note 2. Wanniski further explained:
Why is . . . Steve Forbes leaving the comfort of his publishing empire for the roughand-tumble of Presidential politics? Because his idol, Jack Kemp, decided he did not
have the stomach to raise $25 million at $1,000 a pop, . . . [which] would require him to
make a thousand promises he . . . could not keep. On CNN’s ‘Capital Gang’ recently,
Mr. Kemp acknowledged that he would be running if Mr. Forbes could supply $25
million. On CNN’s ‘Evans and Novak’ earlier the same day, Mr. Forbes acknowledged
that he would not be running if Mr. Kemp were in the race.
Id.
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check from Mr. Forbes, to take a call from him sooner than from, say,
Mr. Business Week? But so what? His views are closer to Forbes’s
4
than to Business Week’s, with or without campaign contributions.”
Wanniski’s views appear to be in the minority, at least judged by
longstanding laws imposing individual contribution limitations in
federal elections and in many state and local elections. The 2002
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA, more commonly known as
McCain-Feingold) doubled the very modest $1000 individual
contribution limitation from the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act
5
Amendments to $2000 and indexed the limits to inflation; in the 2014
election season the limit is $2600 per election, meaning a person can
give a congressional candidate $5200 (once for the primary and once
6
for the general election). That individual limit nonetheless still allows
amply funded federal campaigns. In the 2012 election, for example,
Democratic candidate Barack Obama and Republican candidate Mitt
Romney (along with affiliated party committees) each raised above
7
$1 billion. Candidates are raising a lot of money in contributions of
$5200 or less.
Today, however, millions of dollars also are flowing into outside
groups (including groups now dubbed “Super PACs”) that support
presidential candidates much in the same way that Wanniski wanted
Forbes to be able to support Kemp. I argue in this Article that these
Super PAC contributions raise virtually the same risks as large
contributions directly to candidates, that the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence does not allow for regulating contributions to outside
groups in the same way that it allows for regulation of direct
contributions to candidates, that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is
wrong, and that we cannot get around the problem by redefining the
technical definition of coordination to treat Super PAC contributions
like contributions to a candidate.

4. Id.
5. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (West 2014).
6. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 2013-2014, available at http://fec.gov/
pages/brochures/contriblimitschart.htm.
7. HASEN, supra note 1, ch. 16; Presidential Campaign, National Party, and Joint
Committee Fundraising Through December 31, 2012, CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE,
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/president/2012/Presidential%20Fundraising%20byCommittee
_2012.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2014); see FED. ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 6 (indicating that
contributions to state and national political parties are subject to higher individual limits).
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I start in Part I with the case against unlimited contributions
directly to candidates and explain that virtually the same case applies
against unlimited contributions to a reliable Super PAC—a singlecandidate Super PAC that can be expected to further a candidate’s
campaign. In Part II, I explain how the Supreme Court’s new narrow
definition of corruption forecloses arguments for limiting
contributions to these reliable Super PACs directly. Finally, in Part III,
I argue that the attempt to regulate Super PAC contributions through
enhanced “coordination” rules is likely to fail. The problem is with the
Supreme Court’s definition of corruption, and it cannot be solved
through better drafting of coordination or other rules.
I. WHY LIMIT SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTIONS?
Consider four reasons why people may favor contribution limits
and oppose Wanniski’s suggestion to allow an individual to give a
candidate for public office $25 million or more. First, individual
contribution limits deter bribery and extortion (the antibribery
interest). Though I believe that Jack Kemp would not have been
bribable even for $25 million, and that Forbes would not have been
attempting a bribe even if he gave Kemp $25 million, there are many
unscrupulous politicians who could be bribed for much less. For
example, a New York State Assembly Member was recently convicted
for accepting a mere $22,000 bribe in exchange for taking favorable
8
actions related to an adult day care center. Bribery is already very
difficult to detect because people who are bribed want to keep it a
secret. But bribery would be even easier if very large campaign
contributions were legal. As things stand now, unscrupulous
individuals wanting to engage in a bribery transaction need to hide
both the agreement and the payments. If unlimited contributions were
allowed, the only thing that conspirators would need to hide is the
agreement: “I will give you $25 million and in exchange you will
support legislation for a tax break that will save me $1 billion.” By
keeping individual contributions limits low, there is not enough
money at stake in campaign contributions for a politician to be
bought, and unscrupulous individuals need to take steps to hide
money that cannot be provided through a campaign contribution.
8. John Herzfeld, Jury Convicts N.Y. State Legislator on Charges of Trading Favors for
Bribes, BLOOMBERG BNA MONEY & POLITICS REPORT (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://news.bna.com/mpdm/MPDMWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=39901945&vname=mpebulallis
sues&fn=39901945&jd=39901945.
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Relatedly, politicians cannot demand $25 million in exchange for not
retaliating against would-be wealthy donors because there is no way
the potential donor could directly give that money.
Second, individual contribution limits prevent undue influence
and conflicts of interest (the anti-undue influence interest). Some
supporters of limits worry not just about outright bribery, but also
that, thanks to human nature and feelings of reciprocity, candidates
who receive extremely large contributions will feel grateful to large
donors and will take legislative and other steps to favor the donors.
This happens not through any quid pro quo exchange but instead
through norms of reciprocity. The human mind being as it is, it is quite
easy for people to rationalize taking actions consistent with their own
self-interest. As Dan Lowenstein observed long ago, candidates who
can take very large campaign contributions from those who have
9
business before the candidate have an inherent conflict of interest. At
the very least, large contributions can buy access, giving the large
donor much more influence over an elected official’s thinking and
agenda than the typical voter.
Third, individual contribution limits promote political equality by
limiting both the sale of access and disproportionate influence over
election outcomes (the equality interest). Wanniski pooh-poohed the
objection that Kemp would take Forbes’s phone calls, reasoning that
Kemp would have done that without the contribution and that,
because Kemp’s ideology lined up with Forbes’s ideology, the extra
10
access would make no difference in policy. That may well be true of
the Kemp-Forbes relationship, but it may not be true for many large
donors. To use the earlier example, a donor might give $25 million to a
candidate not because the donor agrees with the candidate’s ideology,
but because the donor hopes it will give the candidate the opportunity
to make a pitch for a $1 billion tax cut. To some, this access is unfair
because only the large donor gets to make the pitch for the tax cut
while those on the other side or with other interests are much less
likely to get the same access. Further, there is a separate equality
concern: The $25 million contribution could make it more likely that
the candidate gets elected, and that means that the large donor has a
bigger say over the outcome of the election than others who feel just
as passionately but lack the same funds to support the candidates of
9. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is
Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 323–29 (1989).
10. Wanniski, supra note 2.
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their choice.
Fourth, individual contribution limits could promote public
confidence in the electoral process by reducing the appearance of
corruption or the appearance of inequality (the public confidence
interest). If the public believes that large donors are bribing
candidates,
large
donors
have
undue
influence
over
candidates/elected officials, large donors have unfair access to
candidates/elected officials, or large donors have disproportionate
influence over the outcome of elections, the public could lose
confidence in the fairness of the electoral process.
Opponents of strong campaign regulation contest these points on
empirical grounds, normative grounds, or both. Although virtually no
one supports bribery of elected officials, some contend that outright
bribery is rare, based on the number of prosecutions, and that bribery
would not rise appreciably with very large legal campaign
11
contributions. Even though campaign contributions are valuable to
candidates, they may not be nearly as valuable to unscrupulous
12
13
politicians as piles of cash in the freezer or a new yacht.
Some believe undue influence or the sale of access should not
count as corruption, and that all the law should do is prevent actual
quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of quid pro quo
14
corruption. Some reject political equality as a legitimate reason for
15
limiting campaign contributions, and note that empirical evidence
casts serious doubts on any relationship between campaign finance
laws and public confidence in the government or the electoral

11. See Stephen A. Ansolabehere, The Scope of Corruption: Lessons from Comparative
Campaign Finance Disclosure, 6 ELECTION L.J. 163, 175 (2006).
12. Jerry Markon, Ex-Rep. Jefferson Gets 13 Years in Freezer Cash Case, WASH. POST
(Nov. 14, 2009), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-11-14/news/36786791_1_william-jjefferson-prison-term-robert-p-trout.
13. Bill Chappell, Former Rep. ‘Duke’ Cunningham Freed After Bribery Conviction, NPR
NEWS (Jun. 4, 2013, 2:45 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/06/04/188667106/
former-rep-duke-cunningham-freed-after-bribery-sentence. But it is important not to
underestimate how much personal value candidates and elected officials can still get out of
campaign contributions, including by taking luxury vacations with lobbyists and fundraisers. See
Eric Lipton, A Loophole Allows Lawmakers to Reel in Trips and Donations, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/20/us/politics/a-loophole-allows-lawmakers-to-reelin-trips-and-donations.html (explaining how a statutory loophole allows lobbyists to mask
contributions).
14. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Super PACs and the Role of “Coordination” in Campaign
Finance Law, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 603, 615 (2013).
15. See, e.g., BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH 195–96 (2003).
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process. Admittedly, the relationship between money spent on
elections and electoral outcomes is complicated; therefore it is
17
difficult to define the proper scope of necessary regulation.
I will return to these objections and related constitutional issues
shortly, but first I want to contrast Wanniski’s Forbes-Kemp scenario
with two other relationships involving rich donors and presidential
candidates. In 2004, liberal financier George Soros wanted to help
defeat Republican President George W. Bush, who was running for
18
reelection. Soros could give only a few thousand dollars directly to
the campaign of Democrat John Kerry. But Soros gave approximately
19
$27 million to other organizations that promoted Kerry’s candidacy.
At the time, federal law provided that an individual could not give
more than $5000 to a political committee supporting candidates for
federal office. But Soros gave millions to the “non-federal fund”
(ostensibly not subject to the $5000 limit) of Americans Coming
20
Together (ACT), a political organization organized under section
527 of the tax code. ACT claimed that even though it was running ads
attacking Bush and supporting Kerry and others, and even though it
was headed by Kerry’s former campaign manager, it could pay for
those ads mostly out of its non-federal fund and therefore was not
bound by the $5000 individual contribution limitation. There was no
evidence the group coordinated with Kerry’s campaign, but ACT did
mimic the campaign’s advertising strategy. A few years after the
election, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) determined that
ACT violated pre-Citizens United campaign finance law, imposed a
$775,000 fine, and decided ACT should have paid more from its
federal political account (to be used for federal election activity and
subject to the contribution limits applicable to federal political action
committees) because its major purpose was to elect a federal
21
candidate.
In particular, ACT should not have accepted
16. Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance:
When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2004).
17. For a summary, see LOWENSTEIN, HASEN & TOKAJI, supra note 1, at 676–80.
18. Thomas B. Edsall, Soros-Backed Activist Group Disbands as Interest Fades, WASH.
POST (Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/
AR2005080201849.html.
19. George Soros, Maintaining Political Interest, NPR NEWS (June 10, 2006, 8:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5476317.
20. Edsall, supra note 18 (“Soros and his close associate . . . together put $38.5 million into
ACT and the Media Fund. With this seed money, the two organizations collected $196.4 million,
enough to . . . flood the airwaves with pro-Democratic commercials in the early spring of 2004
when Kerry’s campaign was broke.”).
21. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, CONCILIATION AGREEMENT IN THE MATTER OF AMERICA
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contributions exceeding $5000 from individuals to pay for these ads.
Those with serious concerns about Soros giving $27 million
directly to Kerry should have similar concerns about Soros giving the
same amount to independent groups with close personal ties to Kerry.
Again, though I have no reason to doubt the honesty of Kerry and
Soros, unscrupulous donors and candidates could agree to a bribe,
with the money going to a group committed to doing everything to
elect the candidate. That committee need not even know about the
bribe; it is certainly not required that there be “bargaining
23
opportunities” involving the outside group. The other interests noted
for limiting contributions to candidates are in play as well: A large
donor to an independent group could well have undue influence over
the candidate, even if the financial support is marginally attenuated;
the large donor to the independent group is likely to get special access
to the candidate and the large contribution could have an outsized
influence on the election campaign; and the public’s confidence could
be shaken by a large contribution to an independent group with close
ties to the candidate. All of these arguments are somewhat lessened
by the independence of the outside group, but they are still present.
The second scenario concerns the 2012 presidential election, and
the campaign contributions of conservative casino magnate Sheldon
Adelson. By the time of the 2012 election, court decisions had begun
to transform the campaign finance landscape in favor of major
24
donors: The Supreme Court had decided Citizens United v. FEC,
allowing independent corporate spending in elections, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had
25
decided SpeechNow.Org v. FEC, allowing individuals to give
unlimited sums to political committees that make only independent
expenditures supporting or opposing candidates. On the regulatory
front, the FEC had issued two advisory opinions allowing corporate
and labor union contributions to these independent expenditure-only

COMING TOGETHER 1 (2007), available at http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocs/000061A1.pdf.
22. FEC to Collect $775,000 Civil Penalty from Americans Coming Together, FED.
ELECTION COMM’N (Aug. 29, 2007), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2007/20070829act.shtml;
Kenneth P. Vogel, Soros-Linked Group Hit with Huge Fine, POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2007, 5:51 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0807/5555.html. ACT did not admit wrongdoing in
agreeing to settle the case. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 21.
23. Cf. Smith, supra note 14, at 632 (“No bargaining opportunities arise unless [the Super
PAC employee] has contact with the campaign or candidate post-Super PAC employment.”).
24. 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
25. 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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26

committees, which became known as Super PACs. In the 2012
elections, all of the serious presidential candidates had singlecandidate Super PACs supporting them, with many headed by friends
27
or former campaign associates. Some Super PACs even took
28
campaign contributions from the candidate’s family members. In
essence, these Super PACs were the legal version of what ACT was
trying to do back in 2004.
Adelson gave unprecedented sums to Super PACs—first $20
million to Winning Our Future, the Super PAC supporting Republican
Newt Gingrich in the Republican primaries, and then $30 million to
Restore Our Future, the Super PAC supporting Mitt Romney’s
29
general election campaign against President Obama. Restore Our
Future was headed by Charlie Spies, a close associate of Mitt
30
Romney. There was no evidence Restore Our Future violated the
rules on coordinating with the Romney campaign. But, consistent
with FEC rulings, Romney was allowed to solicit funds (of no more
31
than $5000) for the independent group. (President Obama
apparently did the same thing, soliciting funds for Priorities USA, a
pro-Obama Super PAC headed by Bill Burton, a former close
32
associate of Obama. ) Restore Our Future complemented the
Romney campaign’s strategy, and generally mimicked the campaign’s

26. Club for Growth, Inc., FEC Adv. Op. 2010-09 (July 22, 2010), http://saos.fec.gov/
aodocs/AO%202010-09.pdf; Commonsense Ten, FEC Adv. Op. 2010-11 (July 22, 2010),
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO2010-11.pdf.
27. See Nicholas Confessore & Michael Luo, G.O.P. Donors Show Thirst to Oust Obama
in November, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/us/politics/
campaign-finance-reports-show-super-pac-donors.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Dan Eggen, The
Influence Industry: ‘Candidate Super PACs’ Surge Ahead in 2012 Money Race, WASH. POST
(Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-influence-industry-candidatesuper-pacs-surge-ahead-in-the-2012-money-race/2011/08/24/gIQAm5qBcJ_story.html.
28. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, Huntsman’s Father Gave $1.9 Million to Super PAC,
N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS BLOG (Jan. 31, 2012, 11:44 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.
com/2012/01/31/huntsman-sr-gave-1-9-million-to-pro-huntsman-super-pac/.
29. Theodoric Meyer, How Much Did Sheldon Adelson Really Spend on Campaign 2012?,
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-much-did-sheldonadelson-really-spend-on-campaign-2012.
30. Restore Our Future, FACTCHECK.ORG (July 25, 2012), http://www.factcheck.org/
2011/09/restore-our-future/.
31. Ryan J. Reilly, FEC: Politicians Can Solicit Donations for ‘Super PACs,’ But Only up
to 5K, TALKING POINTS MEMO (June 30, 2011, 8:05 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/
muckraker/fec-politicians-can-solicit-donations-for-super-pacs-but-only-up-to-5k.
32. Priorities U.S.A./Priorities USA Action, FACTCHECK.ORG (Aug. 6, 2012),
http://www.factcheck.org/2011/09/priorities-usapriorities-usa-action/; Amanda Terkel & Sam
Stein, Obama Broke Super PAC Pledge During Campaign, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/04/obama-super-pac_n_4214466.html.
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33

message. Adelson’s contributions to Restore Our Future and
Winning Our Future were part of the $98 million to $150 million (or
34
more) that Adelson and his wife contributed in the 2012 elections —
making Wanniski’s plea for $25 million to Kemp in 1996 seem quaint.
As with the Soros-Kerry connection, the Adelson-Romney
connection raised concerns similar to those that would have been
raised had Adelson made a multi-million dollar contribution directly
to Romney. To repeat, though I have no reason to doubt the honesty
of Romney and Adelson, unscrupulous donors and candidates could
agree to a bribe with the money going to a group committed to doing
everything to elect the candidate. Once again, there need be no
bargaining involving the Super PAC directly. The anti-undue
influence, political equality, and public confidence arguments are the
same as in Soros-Kerry. The independence of the Super PAC may
somewhat alleviate, but does not eliminate, those concerns.
One additional concern about undue influence arises from Super
PACs that does not arise from direct contributions to candidates (at
least in a world where individual contributions are limited): A wealthy
individual or entity could threaten to bankroll a large Super PAC
working against an elected official up for reelection in the event that
official acts inconsistently with the wealthy individual or entity’s
35
interests. Even without an explicit threat or quid pro quo, an elected
official could be influenced out of fear that the wealthy individuals or
entities will bankroll her opposition. This threat is much more
credible when the individual or entity can give unlimited
contributions to a Super PAC, as opposed to simply giving the
maximum individual contribution amount to an opposing candidate.
These three examples demonstrate that the case for contribution
limits to individual candidates resembles the case for contribution
limits to independent groups, or at least to groups that are closely
aligned with the candidates. Though some small differences remain

33. In fact, at one point during the 2012 campaign, Restore Our Future ran the same ad,
word for word, as Romney himself ran in the 2008 presidential election. Domenico Montanaro,
Pro Romney Super PAC Recycles Romney 2007 Ad, NBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/02/23/10488670-pro-romney-super-pac-recycles-2007romney-campaign-ad?lite.
34. Meyer, supra note 29. As Meyer explains, certain groups, such as those organized
under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, need not publicly disclose details
regarding the contributions they receive. Id.
35. Richard L. Hasen, The Biggest Danger of Super PACs, CNN OPINION (Jan. 9, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/09/opinion/hasen-super-pacs/index.html.
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between contributing directly to the candidate and giving to a
supportive Super PAC, in general, the concerns about large
contributions are parallel. If one believes it is desirable to limit
contributions directly to candidates, one should favor limits on
contributions to single-candidate Super PACs as well.
II. SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTION LIMITS AND THE FIGHT OVER
“CORRUPTION”
In Part I, I listed four different interests that could justify
individual contribution limitations applied directly to candidates as
well as to single-issue reliable Super PACs supporting candidates: the
antibribery interest, the anti-undue influence interest, the political
equality interest, and the public confidence interest. Whether these
interests or others motivate those who support contribution interests,
and the relative importance of each interest, is hard to say.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has limited the types of interests that
may be weighed against the First Amendment rights of those who
36
contribute and want to accept contributions. The Court also has
required application of “exacting scrutiny” as the balancing test for
37
judging the constitutionality of contribution limits. Thus, only some
arguments to sustain individual contribution limits will pass judicial
muster.
38
To sum up the matter briefly, the Supreme Court has accepted
only the interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption to justify contribution limitations to candidates—although
39
the definition of “corruption” has shifted over time. Under an
exacting scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld
contribution limitations applied in candidate elections, except in one
instance when the Court held a limit was so low as to prevent a
40
candidate from being able to engage in effective advocacy.

36. See HASEN, supra note 1, chs. 14–15.
37. Id.
38. For more detailed analysis, see id.; LOWENSTEIN, HASEN & TOKAJI, supra note 1, chs.
12–14.
39. For a clear and useful taxonomy, see Yasmin Dawood, Classifying Corruption, 9 DUKE
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2014).
40. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006); see generally Richard L. Hasen, The Newer
Incoherence: Competition, Social Science, and Balancing in Campaign Finance Law After
Randall v. Sorrell, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 849 (2007).
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The Supreme Court has not directly weighed the constitutionality
41
of contribution limits to independent groups such as Super PACs.
However, in the context of spending limits, to which the Supreme
Court has applied strict scrutiny, Citizens United held that spending by
independent groups cannot corrupt or create the appearance of
42
corruption. Thereafter, the D.C. Circuit in SpeechNow held that if

41. Before Citizens United, there was some question whether the Court in a 1981 case, Cal.
Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981), had endorsed limitations on campaign contributions to
independent expenditure committees and then reaffirmed the constitutionality of limits in
McConnell v. FEC in its footnote 48. See Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live
Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 69 (2004).
42. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359–61 (2010). Here is the key portion of that
analysis:
When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo
corruption. The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected
officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt:
Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics. It is
in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by
necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those
policies. It is well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not
the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one
candidate over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those
political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on
responsiveness. [McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)].
Reliance on a “generic favoritism or influence theory . . . is at odds with standard First
Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting
principle.”
The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to
lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is political
speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate. The fact
that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend money to try to persuade
voters presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected officials.
This is inconsistent with any suggestion that the electorate will refuse to take part in
democratic governance because of additional political speech made by a corporation
or any other speaker. . . .
The McConnell record was “over 100,000 pages” long, yet it “does not have any direct
examples of votes being exchanged for . . . expenditures.” This confirms Buckley’s
reasoning that independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of,
quid pro quo corruption. In fact, there is only scant evidence that independent
expenditures even ingratiate. Ingratiation and access, in any event, are not corruption.
The BCRA record establishes that certain donations to political parties, called “soft
money,” were made to gain access to elected officials. This case, however, is about
independent expenditures, not soft money. When Congress finds that a problem
exists, we must give that finding due deference; but Congress may not choose an
unconstitutional remedy. If elected officials succumb to improper influences from
independent expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if they put
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independent spending cannot corrupt, then contributions to fund
43
independent spending cannot corrupt either. How can we square this
analysis with the analysis in Part I, which showed that similar interests
support individual contribution limits and limits on contributions to
Super PACs and other independent groups? Why reach divergent
constitutional outcomes in the two cases?
To begin with, we can take the third interest, political equality, off
the table. Even if equalization does motivate supporters of
44
contribution limitations, the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, FEC v.
45
46
Davis, and Citizens United has rejected the interest. The rejection is
all the clearer after Citizens United overturned cases obliquely
embracing a political equality rationale in the context of corporate
47
spending and labor union spending. Indeed, following the Court’s
recent opinion in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v.
48
Bennett, striking down the matching funds portion of Arizona’s
public financing law, if political equality is even part of a law’s
49
motivation, the law may violate the First Amendment.
As to the three other interests—antibribery, anti-undue influence,
and public confidence—the Court’s treatment of contribution and
spending limits has diverged for empirical and conceptual reasons.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has said that the prevention of
corruption or the appearance of corruption can justify contribution
limits. But the problem becomes what the Court means by
50
“corruption,” a concept that has shifted over time. Empirically,
expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for concern. We must give
weight to attempts by Congress to seek to dispel either the appearance or the reality
of these influences. The remedies enacted by law, however, must comply with the First
Amendment; and, it is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the
governing rule. An outright ban on corporate political speech during the critical
preelection period is not a permissible remedy. Here Congress has created categorical
bans on speech that are asymmetrical to preventing quid pro quo corruption.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
44. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
45. 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
46. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 379–84 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); Davis, 554 U.S. 724,
741–42; Buckley, 424 U.S. 48–49.
47. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109
MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011) (explaining the change in the doctrine).
48. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
49. Id. at 2825–26; see also id. at 2843–44 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“This Court, after all, has
never said that a law restricting speech (or any other constitutional right) demands two
compelling interests. One is enough. And this statute has one: preventing corruption. So it does
not matter that equalizing campaign speech is an insufficient interest.”).
50. See HASEN, supra note 1, chs. 13–14 (summarizing the shifts in the doctrine).
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Citizens United appears to establish—as an uncontestable fact—that
independent spending cannot corrupt or create the appearance of
corruption.
I have been quite critical of this determination, because it does not
allow factfinders to consider a contrary conclusion based upon actual
51
evidence. As Part I demonstrated, the potential for quid pro quo
bribery appears nearly as strong when it comes to large contributions
flowing to a reliable single-candidate Super PAC—understood as one
staffed by close associates of the candidate and backed by the
candidate’s friends and family—as with contributions flowing to the
candidate directly. When the Super PAC is reliable, the money is just
as valuable as in the campaign coffers (except for those candidates
who would use the money in the coffers for personal, not political,
benefits).
Citizens United appears to exclude the possible bribery role of
52
contributions to reliable Super PACs, and if the Court ever considers
the issue it could well agree with the SpeechNow.Org court that
contributions to fund independent spending cannot cause quid pro
quo corruption any more than independent spending can.
The parallel empirical issue arises with respect to the fourth
interest, the public confidence interest. As discussed in Part I, the
potential for the public to lose confidence in our system of
government or the electoral process appears nearly as strong when it
comes to large contributions flowing to a reliable single-candidate
Super PAC as with contributions flowing to the candidate directly. But
once again, Citizens United appears to exclude the possibility of
demonstrating that large contributions to a candidate’s reliable Super
53
PAC can cause the public to lose confidence in government.
This leaves the second interest, the undue influence interest.
Recall the concern here is elected officials who are too compliant
with the interests of donors, and too willing to grant an audience to
those donors. Indeed, in the case of potential Super PAC donors, the
undue influence concern may be greater because elected officials may
fear potential donors may donate not to the candidate or a supportive
Super PAC but to an opposing Super PAC, against the candidate. This
51. Hasen, supra note 47.
52. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356–61 (rejecting arguments that money spent
independent of candidates can corrupt or create the appearance of corruption). If independent
spending can never corrupt, then contributions to fund independent spending can never corrupt.
53. See id.
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(sometimes implicit) threat could give those potential donors
improper access, providing a strong anticorruption basis for limiting
contributions to Super PACs.
The problem with using undue influence as a form of corruption is
not only empirical but also conceptual. In a series of earlier
contributions cases, most notably Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
54
Government PAC, the Supreme Court endorsed an undue influence
theory of corruption, and relatedly an appearance of undue influence
55
theory of corruption. These cases, however, are in considerable
tension with Citizens United and the Supreme Court’s most recent
56
campaign finance case, McCutcheon v. FEC. Although the Citizens
United Court was careful to note that it was not deciding the
57
constitutionality of contribution limits, it rejected these earlier cases’
broad theory of corruption—at least in evaluating spending limits—
58
by concluding that ingratiation and access are not corruption. If
neither undue influence nor the appearance of undue influence are
valid theories of corruption then it is hard to see the path toward
sustaining contribution limits to Super PACs.
If there was any doubt before over whether the Court’s narrow
definition of corruption and the appearance of corruption applies to
contribution limitations, there is no longer. As this Article went to
press, the Supreme Court decided McCutcheon, striking down federal
limits on the total (or “aggregate”) amount that a donor may give in a
two-year election cycle to all candidates, federal political parties, and
59
PACs that make direct contributions to candidates. Although a full
analysis of this case is beyond the scope of this Article, McCutcheon
makes three moves of doctrinal significance that make it even less
likely that courts will accept limitations on contributions to Super

54. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
55. Id. at 382–83, 397–96; see generally Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign
Finance, and “The Thing That Wouldn’t Leave”, 17 CONST. COMMENTARY 483 (2000); Hasen,
supra note 35.
56. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
57. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (“Citizens United has not made
direct contributions to candidates, and it has not suggested that the Court should reconsider
whether contribution limits should be subjected to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.”).
58. The Court did suggest that the analysis might be different for large, soft money
contributions: “The BCRA record establishes that certain donations to political parties, called
‘soft money,’ were made to gain access to elected officials. This case, however, is about
independent expenditures, not soft money.” Id. at 360. It is not clear how to reconcile this part
of Citizens United with the rest of the opinion.
59. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442.
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60

PACs.
First, the Court incorporated the narrow definition of corruption
from Citizens United into the contributions context, ignoring the
61
much broader definition in Shrink Missouri. Second, the Court made
a similar move reading the appearance of corruption to apply only to
62
an “appearance of quid pro quo corruption,” severely constricting
Buckley’s broader concern about an “appearance of improper
63
influence.” Finally, the Court, again ignoring Shrink Missouri,
severely ratcheted up the meaning of “exacting scrutiny” to a much
64
more “rigorous” test. Taken as a whole, McCutcheon calls the
constitutionality of all contribution limits into question.
In sum, although the arguments for individual contribution limits
applied to candidate campaign accounts and to single-candidate
reliable Super PACs appear to be very close to each other and
roughly similar in strength, current Supreme Court doctrine makes it
extremely unlikely that possible arguments for contribution limits will
be successfully applied to Super PACs. Part of the problem is
empirical (rejection of the potential for quid pro quo corruption for
contributions funding independent spending); part is conceptual
(rejection of undue influence as a legitimate form of corruption); and
part is normative (rejection of the political equality interest for
limiting contributions). In short, it may take a change in Supreme
Court personnel to sustain contribution limits in this area.
III. THE COORDINATION PROXY WAR
Savvy campaign finance reformers understand that the Citizens
United, McCutcheon, and SpeechNow.Org reading of the meaning of
corruption makes it difficult under current doctrine to sustain
contribution limitations for Super PACs and other independent
expenditure committees. This roadblock has caused some supporters
60. I explain these three moves in greater detail in Richard L. Hasen, Die Another Day:
The Supreme Court Takes a Big Step Closer to Gutting the Last Bits of Campaign Finance
Reform, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/
2014/04/the_subtle_awfulness_of_the_mccutcheon_v_fec_campaign_finance_decision_the.html.
61. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441, 1450–51.
62. Id.
63. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976); see also Richard L. Hasen, Opening the
Political Money Chutes, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/
04/07/opening-the-political-money-chutes/.
64. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1446 (“[I]f a law that restricts political speech does not
‘avoid unnecessary abridgement’ of First Amendment rights, it cannot survive ‘rigorous’
review.” (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25)).
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to seek an alternative route to cover such conduct: the coordination
65
rules. Federal law treats coordinated expenditures as contributions,
and therefore if Super PACs “coordinate” their activity with
candidates, they can no longer raise unlimited contributions. If the
Super PAC and candidate sit down and discuss strategy, for example,
the two entities are coordinating and the coordination rules apply.
Unfortunately for those of us who support Super PAC contribution
limits, the coordination route appears even less promising than the
anticorruption argument for sustaining such limits.
Advocates of reforming coordination rules posit that the
overlapping personal and personnel connections between a
candidate’s committee and a single-candidate reliable Super PAC
justify treating contributions to the Super PAC as coordinated with
the candidate’s committee, and therefore subject to the individual
contribution limits. For example, the proposed American Anti66
Corruption Act (AACA), which has been promoted by former FEC
67
Chairman Trevor Potter, Professor Larry Lessig, and others, provides
the following coordination approach:
PROVISION 7: REVISE THE FEC’S COORDINATION
REGULATIONS
The FEC’s current coordination regulations, located at 11 C.F.R. §
109.21, permit extensive collaboration between candidates and
supposedly “independent” Super PACs.
Amend the Federal Election Campaign Act, by adding at §
431(17)(C), the following:
In order for an expenditure to be considered an independent
expenditure, the organization paying for the expenditure must act
totally independently of any candidate or political party. This
includes, but is not limited to, requirements that the person making
the expenditure may not employ or retain any individual or accept
any assistance, including the solicitation of funds, from any
65. Federal law defines “contributions” to include “expenditures made by any person in
cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate.”
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (West 2014); see also Shays v.
FEC, 528 F.3d 914, 919–20 (D.C. Cir. 2008); 11 C.F.R. § 109.21; Smith, supra note 13, at 607–08.
66. See AMERICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION ACT, anticorruptionact.org (last visited Jan. 19,
2014). The text of the Act is posted at https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.unitedrepublic.org/docs/
AACA_Full_Provisions.pdf.
67. Richard Painter, Lawrence Lessig, Trevor Potter, Theodore Roosevelt IV, Josh Silver et
al. Push for Sweeping Anti-Corruption Legislation, LEGAL ETHICS FORUM (Nov. 14, 2012),
http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2012/11/lawrence-lessig-trevor-potter-theodore-roosevelt
-iv-josh-silver-et-al-push-for-sweeping-anti-corrupt.html.
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individual who is the candidate benefited by such expenditure, or
who has, with respect to the candidate benefited by such
expenditure, within the last 5 years (1) raised funds for the
candidate; (2) been employed or retained by the candidate or
candidate’s campaign(s) or the congressional office or committee
staff of a Member of Congress or the Executive office of the
President; (3) been employed or retained by a national political
party committee of the political party of the candidate; (4) been
employed or retained by a vendor employed or retained by the
candidate, candidate’s campaign(s), or candidate’s party committee
of that candidate to act in a fundraising, polling, media consultant,
or campaign management capacity; or is (5) a spouse, partner, or
relative of the candidate (father, mother, sister, brother, child, first
cousin, aunt, uncle) (6) a current or former business partner or
colleague of the candidate or of an employee of the candidate’s
campaign. Additionally, if a candidate publicly or privately
endorses or approves of an organization’s expenditure benefiting
that candidate or any of the organization’s activities, then the
expenditures of such organization shall be deemed coordinated
with such candidate.

Professor Richard Briffault offers a coordination proposal that
addresses regulation of reliable Super PACs:
I propose that for any organization that (i) focuses all of its
electioneering expenditures on one or a very small number of
candidates, and (ii) either is staffed by individuals who used to
work for the candidate, the candidate’s campaign committee, or a
political party in the current or past election cycle; has received
fundraising support from a candidate, the candidate’s campaign, or
staff; or has been publicly endorsed by the candidate as a vehicle
for supporting that candidate, that organization is to be treated as
a coordinated organization with that candidate or candidates, and
its spending treated as coordinated spending with that of the
68
candidate or candidates it supports.

The AACA and the Briffault proposals, however, reach much
more broadly than actual coordination. For example, the AACA
targets Super PACs that employ anyone who is politically active or
any relative, former colleague, or former donor of a candidate. The
AACA would effectively bar Super PACs from employing anyone
who has worked for any member of Congress (not just the supported
68. See Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88,
97 (2013), available at http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Briffault113-Colum.-L.-Rev.-88-2013.pdf.
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candidate) for the last five years. This definition has nothing to do
with coordination and is instead simply a way to put single-candidate
(and many other) Super PACs out of business. Briffault’s proposal
targets those individuals who had a close relationship with the
candidate before forming the Super PAC.
Supporters of the AACA might defend the broad coordination
standard as a prophylactic means to prevent those with close personal
relationships to a candidate from using those connections to
surreptitiously coordinate on strategy. But actual coordination is
unnecessary to achieve the aims of supporting a candidate and there
is no need for those with a personal relationship to a candidate to risk
a felony. The information that a Super PAC needs to be an effective
proxy for a campaign is all public, and nothing depends on the
personal relationship. As election lawyer Bob Bauer notes, “why do
[candidates and Super PAC employees] have to have known each
69
other when they can read websites and tweets?”
Briffault’s proposal is narrower than the AACA’s proposal, and
much more defensible than the AACA’s blunderbuss approach.
Further, there is no question Briffault is right that a single-candidate
Super PAC will share a common purpose with a candidate’s campaign.
He explains the basis for his proposal:
The thrust of the first factor is that if a committee is devoting all of
its election spending to promoting a specific candidate—whether
with affirmative ads or attacks on that candidate’s opponent—then
donations to that committee are effectively donations to the
candidate. If an organization is involved in multiple election
contests, then donations to the organization cannot be said to go to
the aid of a specific candidate. In that case, although the
organization’s spending may benefit certain candidates, the link
between a particular donor and a particular candidate is
attenuated. But where the organization is a single-candidate
committee, the connection between donor and ultimate
beneficiary is much stronger, and the donation begins to resemble
Buckley’s “disguised contribution.” . . .
The second factor addresses the concern that it is possible for a
committee to be formed by a truly independent group of
concerned citizens to advance just one candidate, but also to stress
69. Robert F. Bauer, Professor Briffault on Super PACs and the Question of
SOFT
MONEY
HARD
LAW
(May
8,
2013),
“Coordination”,
MORE
http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2013/05/professor-briffault-on-super-pacs-and-the-ques
tion-of-coordination/.
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particular issues, concerns, or campaign themes that differ from
those of the supported candidate. Even though focused solely on a
single candidate in a specific election, such a group might still fit
the model the Supreme Court sought to protect in Buckley. But
the involvement in the committee of individuals with recent ties to
the candidate or the endorsement of the committee’s work by the
candidate or his staff indicates that the committee is very likely to
act consistently with the preferred strategies, tactics, messages, and
themes of the candidate and to act as an alter ego for the
candidate’s official campaign even without the explicit interactions
70
that the law currently looks for.

Briffault’s analysis, however, apparently conflates coordination
with common purpose. As Professor Bradley Smith persuasively
argues, Buckley’s understanding of coordination focuses on
coordination of campaign strategy, and not simply the closeness of the
71
prior or current relationship among different individuals or groups.
A rule that would equate common goals and common histories with
coordination of campaign strategy would go well beyond the goal of
barring disguised contributions. In other words, to show coordination,
it is not enough to prove that the Super PAC acts “consistently” with
the candidate’s views or even “as an alter ego”; coordination requires

70. Briffault, supra note 68, at 97–99. Briffault continues:
The ties that indicate that a committee is not truly independent of a candidate would
include having staff who recently worked for the candidate, either on her campaign or
in her government office; who recently worked for a committee of that candidate’s
party; who raised funds for a current or recent campaign of that candidate; or who
recently worked for a vendor who provides campaign services to the candidate. A
committee that exists solely to promote one or a very small number of candidates and
is organized and operated by individuals with recent strong political ties to that
candidate or candidates is very likely to be viewed by the candidate or candidates
aided as providing integral support to their campaigns even in the absence of express
current interaction between the independent committee and the candidate. Under
those circumstances, it would be fair to say that donations to that committee should be
treated as disguised contributions to the candidate.
Similarly, even without the use of overlapping staff, if the candidate or his committee
endorses or approves of an organization’s campaign activities on his behalf, calls on
donors to give to that committee, participates in fundraising activities for it, or
otherwise signals support for the organization’s campaign work, that, too, indicates
that the candidate considers the committee to be a part of his campaign. Even in the
absence of substantive discussions about campaign strategy, involvement in decisions
about advertising messages, or transmission of inside information, the candidate’s
endorsement of the organization’s work indicates that the candidate and committee
are acting in concert to promote the candidate’s election.
Id.
71. Smith, supra note 14, at 630–35.
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proof of “the explicit interactions that the law currently looks for.” A
coordination rule that does not require explicit interactions appears
73
to violate the First Amendment.
Briffault is on stronger grounds when he argues for a rule that
treats candidates who urge donors to give to the Super PAC as
coordinating with that Super PAC. A candidate who raises funds for a
group by definition is coordinating fundraising strategy with that
group; the candidate is taking time to raise funds for the group rather
than for his campaign. Even Smith seems to agree that treating this
activity as coordination would be constitutional under existing
doctrine, at least when it involves a candidate soliciting funds for a
74
single-candidate Super PAC. That fundraising lets would-be donors
and the world know that a donation to the Super PAC is just as good
(or better, given the lack of contribution limits) as a donation to the
candidate’s campaign. After all, Mitt Romney was probably a lot
happier with Sheldon Adelson’s $30 million contribution to Restore
Our Future than he would have been with $5200 from Adelson to his
campaign committee.
And it is no doubt true that Super PACs with close personal or
personnel ties to the candidate can create a public perception of
undue influence over that candidate. Briffault is surely right that
committees that exist solely to support specific candidates and are
“either . . . organized and directed by individuals with close political
ties to the candidate or . . . recognized as a supporter by the
candidate . . . pose the same dangers of corruption and the appearance
of corruption as donations to the candidate’s official campaign
75
committee.” Indeed, I would argue that reliable Super PACs create
nearly the identical actual undue influence problem that arises when a
donor makes a large campaign contribution directly to a candidate.
But, as we have seen, this idea of creating undue influence through
72. Briffault, supra note 68, at 98.
73. Smith, supra note 14, at 630–35.
74. See id. at 635; see also Bauer, supra note 69 (arguing that fundraising alone does not
allow for treating activity as coordinated). As Bradley Smith has noted:
[T]his type of event, when the soliciting candidate knows that funds raised will be
spent on behalf of his election, probably falls within the constitutional scope of
‘coordination.’ In this case, it is not so much the solicitation per se but the appearance
of the candidate at the event, and the fact that it is known that the PACs sole purpose
is to elect this single candidate.
Bradley A. Smith, Solicitation and Coordination, CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS (Feb. 13,
2014), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2014/02/13/solicitation-and-coordination/.
75. Briffault, supra note 68, at 99.
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outside groups is in tension with the crabbed definition of corruption
and the appearance of corruption under Citizens United and
McCutcheon. Indeed, the problem may be deeper than Citizens
United, and go instead to Buckley’s understanding of the non76
corruptive nature of independent spending. Regardless, undue
influence, as bad as it may be, is not coordination. They are
analytically distinct concepts.
CONCLUSION
The doctrinal move to an expanded definition of coordination to
deal with the problem of Super PACs is completely understandable.
But under current doctrine, courts would likely reject a broad
coordination rule as infringing on the First Amendment rights of
those involved with independent Super PACs.
Instead, coordination is the sideshow and the fight over the
meaning of corruption is the main event. Reformers must convince
the Supreme Court to return to the broader definition of corruption
(or accept some version of the political equality rationale), which
would permit arguments in favor of not just the prevention of bribery
but also the prevention of undue influence. That day may not come
until the Supreme Court personnel changes, but it is the linchpin for
the successful resuscitation of meaningful campaign finance
regulation in the United States.

76. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976). As Buckley explains:
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little
assistance to the candidate’s campaign, and indeed may prove counterproductive. The
absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or
his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate.
Id.

